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Revisiting the Moral Market
Where I Started
In March, before the ceasefire, I argued that the gap between Iranians inside the country and those abroad isn’t really a political disagreement. It’s a clash of two lives that don’t translate into each other. What I called the “moral market” was the result: a place where pain becomes a kind of currency, and recognising the other side’s pain feels like losing some of your own. The cure I offered was simple — try to see the other reality without giving up your own.
I still think the picture was mostly right. The cure was not. You owe your own arguments what you would ask of anyone else’s: push them hard, see where they break, and change your mind when you have to. Mine broke under one push in particular — the one from political economy. The ceasefire has now given that pushback a real-world test.
Where I Got It Wrong
The objection is simple, and it hurts. I treated feelings as the cause and material conditions as scenery. But the calm I credited to the diaspora — its “luxury” of analysis and debate — isn’t a personality trait you get with safety. It’s something you buy. Distance is a commodity, paid for with a passport, money you can move, professional qualifications recognised abroad, and the legal right to leave. The ability to think things over depends on money. Once you see that, my “two languages” are not two cultures that cannot translate. They are accents of different social classes.
I treated sanctions the same way — as one big squeeze on the whole country. They are nothing of the kind. They crush wage-earners, importers of medicine, and the sick, while they enrich the regime’s well-connected friends, because scarcity is profitable for whoever controls it. The fire does not burn the building evenly. Some inside are victims of the same machine that other insiders feed off. Inside and outside are not two sealed worlds; they are one circuit, joined by remittance, property, family money, and capital flight.
Diaspora activism — which I politely asked to be “more honest with itself” — is not an attitude problem either. It is an industry. Visibility is the product, and it turns into grants, fellowships, platforms, and next year’s funding. You do not reform a market by asking the players to look inside themselves. I asked for soul-searching where the problem was income.
The hardest part lands on my own best example. I credited Chile’s transition to the diaspora’s networks, legal know-how, and international contacts — and then I called the cure “empathy.” Those are assets, not feelings. The bridge was built of infrastructure. Empathy redistributes nothing: it does not break the racket that runs the sanctions economy, it does not open exit to those who cannot afford it, and it does not change who pays whom.
Where Economics Stops Too
This cuts both ways. If the psychological reading explains too much by feeling, the economic reading explains too much by structure. A theory that explains everything rules nothing out, which is another way of saying it can never be wrong — and that is the death of a serious argument. I have made the same complaint about other arguments: a claim has to earn its place by surviving the cases that do not fit, not by serving as a master key. Pure economics fails that test in the same place psychology does.
The clearest counter-example is one I have been documenting for two months: people act against their material interests for reasons of identity. The monarchist nostalgia loudest in parts of the diaspora would not put a single rial in its supporters’ pockets if it came true. The young men in SAVAK shirts at Western rallies are not running a portfolio. Aryan myth and dynastic longing are not side-effects of capital. Feelings cause things. The split is not either material position or inherited identity. It is both, each doing work the other cannot.
So the revision is not a switch from feeling to economics. It is a refusal to give either one the final word. Feeling is often the way a material position gets lived — distance felt as calm, dependence felt as contempt. But not always, and not only. The honest question is not “is this damaged feeling, or class interest?” It is the actual problem in front of you, looked at without deciding in advance which layer has to win.
What the Ceasefire Shows
The ceasefire has turned argument into evidence. In March I warned that the push for regime change had mistaken a moment of Iranian weakness for a market opportunity, and that the people inside the burning building would pay the entry fee — the Syrian mistake. That bet has, for now, lapsed. The war did not end in the collapse I feared. A deal is in sight.
What this shows is that the moral market does not close when the shooting stops. It re-prices. The currency is no longer who cheered which strike. It is who gets to claim the peace, who tells the story of the reckoning, and whose words frame the settlement. The faction that mistook a platform for a mandate during the war is now tempted to mistake the ceasefire for its vindication. Inside, the same exhaustion that carried the war will carry the peace terms. The imbalance in who is actually at risk did not end with the fighting; it changed its name.
This is also where the economic reading earns its keep most plainly. The settlement is a distribution question — who gets the sanctions relief, the reconstruction contracts, the reintegration — and recognition will decide none of it. But identity comes back, too: the fight over what Iran becomes now that the West has stopped being the referee cannot be reduced to who holds the contracts.
What I Would Say Now
What survives of the original cure? Less than I claimed. Not nothing. Mutual recognition is real and necessary, but it is the way a settlement might happen, not the settlement itself. Offering a change of feeling as the answer to a problem partly built by structure was the wrong kind of answer. Feeling decides whether the two sides are willing to cross the bridge. It does not lay a single brick.
The test I would put in its place is harder and, what matters, checkable. For the diaspora, the question for any act of engagement is not whether it feels like solidarity. It is whether it actually transfers something — resources, risk, or standing — to the people inside. And: would the act survive if your own name were taken off it? That is a question with a real answer, and most performance fails it. This is not a call for the diaspora to be silent. A voice that actually transfers something is not vanity, and silence is not agreement. For those inside, the matching discipline is to resist the sweeping verdict — not everyone who left, left lightly, and exile is its own kind of damage. And for all of us, the first habit to break is the comfort of curated certainty — the reflex that rewards the loudest claim over the truest.
I will end where the evidence, not the feeling, points. The bridge between inside and outside is built of infrastructure — networks, expertise, transfers, institutions. Feeling may decide whether we want to build it. Honesty about what it is actually made of is the only thing that will keep it standing.
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