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The Ordinary Apocalypse

Critical Observations

On Crossing Borders, Hearing Bombs, and the Stubborn Normality of a Nation at War

Based on a first-hand wartime account from Iran by Kazeroun (@mkazeroun) on X

“The evidence for a nation’s endurance is not found in its monuments but in the behaviour of its people when the monuments are burning.”

The Decision to Go

I travelled to Iran in the middle of a war. I returned almost exactly as a temporary ceasefire was announced. What follows is an attempt to set down what I saw, heard, and understood—written primarily for the Iranian diaspora in the West, with the frank admission that for those who remained inside the country throughout, there may be nothing here they do not already know. That asymmetry itself is part of the story.

The decision to go was not impulsive, though it may appear so. Beyond private reasons, there was a conviction—one I hold with increasing firmness—that a portion of what constitutes Iranian identity is formed by the accumulation of shared experience. We are not merely the inheritors of a civilisational archive; we are also the sum of what we have endured together, in the same air, under the same sky. One of the deepest distortions afflicting the diaspora’s understanding of Iran is precisely the absence of such direct participation. To watch a war on a screen and to hear its percussion in your own chest are not the same act of knowing. I wanted to know.

The Strangeness of Normality

I entered through the Turkish border at Van, by train. I left weeks later overland into Armenia. The passenger crossings, on both ends, were eerily deserted. Cargo traffic, by contrast, moved with its usual indifferent rhythm—trucks laden with goods grinding across frontiers as though the concept of aerial bombardment were an abstraction that applied to other categories of existence. This was the first lesson, and perhaps the most enduring: the machinery of commerce does not pause for the machinery of destruction. It merely reroutes.

The first thing that struck me upon entering Iran was how aggressively normal everything appeared. This was not the apocalyptic landscape that weeks of satellite footage and breathless diaspora commentary had led me to expect. Public services—transport, fuel distribution, food supply chains—were functioning at or near their ordinary capacity. In the smaller cities and villages, the war was an abstraction. People went about their lives. Occasionally, the roar of a fighter jet on its way to or from a larger target would intrude upon the quotidian, a momentary sonic reminder that the country was, in fact, under sustained military assault. Then the sound would pass, and the village would return to itself.

This resilience is not stoicism in the romantic sense. It is not a performance of bravery for an audience. It is something more mundane and, for that reason, more extraordinary: the refusal of eighty-odd million people to permit their daily existence to be fully colonised by someone else’s war. The grocer opens his shop. The metro runs—free of charge during the conflict, though with longer intervals between trains. Children go to school where schools remain open. The war is real, but so is breakfast.

Tehran: A City in Two Registers

Tehran told a more complicated story. The capital operated at roughly twenty per cent of its normal commercial capacity—offices skeletal, businesses muted, the usual anarchic traffic replaced by an almost pastoral calm. By day, the city wore a mask of serenity. The air, mercifully, was clean—one of the few perverse gifts of reduced industrial activity. The streets were quieter than I had ever experienced them: Tehran without traffic is Tehran estranged from itself.

The sounds of war punctuated the daytime hours intermittently. A fighter jet overhead. A distant detonation. If the explosion was not close, life continued without interruption. If you were in the metro or in a car, you might not register the bombing at all. Without checking the news, it was often impossible to know where a strike had landed. This peculiar informational fog—living inside a war whose specific coordinates required a smartphone to locate—produced a dissonance I had not anticipated. War, I had imagined, would be omnipresent. In practice, it was strangely intermittent, like a storm that announces itself in irregular thunder and then retreats behind a deceptive blue sky.

By night, the city transformed. From sunset until well past midnight, the major squares—Ferdowsi, Tajrish, and others—filled with gatherings. Some were state-organised; others were more spontaneous. The Iranian flag was the centrepiece. Convoys of cars draped in flags and blaring martial music or religious hymns circulated through the streets. The anthem of the moment—a rousing number whose refrain translates roughly as “Strike, for you strike well”—became the sonic wallpaper of the nocturnal city. Security checkpoints multiplied after dark: armed vehicles, masked faces, the unmistakable choreography of a state asserting control over the visual and acoustic space of its capital.

The Two Nations

I attended several of these nightly gatherings as an observer. The dominant crowd was unmistakably Hezbollahi—the loyalist base of the Islamic Republic—with its familiar slogans, its religious cadences, its condemnation of traitors and its pledges of allegiance to the Supreme Leader. In some areas, such as Tajrish Square, the demographic composition was marginally broader, but the discursive space remained firmly monopolised. No dissonance was tolerated. The street, in those hours, belonged to one narrative and one narrative only.

And yet, away from the squares, a different country breathed. I encountered many people who considered participation in these rallies a patriotic duty—and just as many who cursed them, though usually in whispers, behind closed doors, or in the privacy of a shared taxi. This, I believe, is the most important observation I can offer: unlike the war of 1980–1988, when the existential threat produced something closer to genuine national cohesion, this conflict has exposed a profound and perhaps irreconcilable duality within Iranian society. The surface is solidarity. Beneath it, two nations coexist in the same geography—speaking the same language, breathing the same air, and understanding almost nothing of each other’s interior lives.

The noise of the rallies—sometimes persisting until one in the morning—was itself a source of friction. Residents of central Tehran, whatever their political sympathies, do not universally appreciate martial hymns at midnight. But this is a minor irritation against the larger canvas. The deeper fracture is ideological, generational, and existential. It will not be healed by a ceasefire.

The Texture of Fear

Between cities, security patrols were frequent—typically at the entry and exit points of towns. I was stopped several times. Most interactions were professional and courteous. Some were not. I will not detail the exceptions, except to say that the experience of being questioned by armed men in a country at war sharpens one’s awareness of the fragility of civility. When power is concentrated and fear is ambient, the space between politeness and menace narrows to a membrane.

The attacks could come at any time, but during the days I spent in Tehran, the northeast of the city bore the heaviest burden. There was a rough pattern: one wave in the early evening, around seven or eight o’clock, and another in the small hours, between three and five in the morning. But patterns are treacherous things in war. They offer the illusion of predictability where none exists. The only honest thing to say is that at any moment, in any place, the sky could open.

Close explosions were genuinely terrifying. I experienced two at proximity, and on both occasions the smell of cordite hung in the air afterwards—an acrid, chemical presence that no amount of descriptive language can adequately convey. It is a smell that rewrites your relationship with the atmosphere. The air you breathe is no longer neutral; it carries evidence.

After a day or two, I found that I had begun to habituate. I could distinguish the sound of an incoming missile from the roar of a jet engine from the percussion of air defence systems. This adaptation is not courage. It is the body’s bureaucratic response to sustained threat—a biological filing system that categorises danger into degrees, the better to permit continued function. The people of Tehran have been living inside this filing system for weeks. Their composure is not indifference. It is survival organised into routine.

The Information Architecture

The day President Trump issued his infamous message—the one that spoke of erasing a civilisation—I was in Tehran. The effect was palpable. Fear intensified. The spectre of a nuclear strike, which had until then occupied the realm of the hypothetical, suddenly migrated into the domain of the plausible. And yet, even then, I witnessed no panic. No stampede. No irrational collective behaviour. People were afraid—visibly, quietly afraid—but they metabolised the fear without surrendering to it. There is a word for this in Persian that resists easy translation: a kind of dignified endurance that is neither passive acceptance nor active defiance, but something woven from both.

Access to the global internet was severely restricted—expensive, unreliable, and for most people effectively impossible. The information environment was almost entirely channelled through domestic platforms, primarily curated messaging channels that reproduced the same narratives in an echo of near-perfect uniformity. Twitter, Telegram, WhatsApp—the tools that had once served as the nervous system of Iranian civil discourse—played virtually no role. The most significant external news source was satellite television, which retained its stubborn relevance precisely because it could not be firewalled.

The management of the war’s narrative was, I must concede, considerably more sophisticated than in previous conflicts. The propaganda apparatus had learned from its predecessors. The billboards and posters plastering the city were uniformly political-ideological in content, and the streets were saturated with AI-generated images of the new Supreme Leader—images whose synthetic quality was immediately apparent but whose sheer volume created a kind of visual fait accompli. When a face is everywhere, its artificiality ceases to matter. Presence substitutes for authenticity.

The Northern Escape and the Road to the Border

The cities of Mazandaran, along the Caspian coast, were swollen with population—internal refugees of a sort, though the word feels too heavy for people who had simply driven a few hours north to breathe. Businesses were functioning, petrol stations were crowded, and the traffic was heavier than in Tehran. The flight path of the jets that bombed the capital and its surroundings ran largely over the Caspian, likely via Azerbaijani airspace, and I heard the sound of fighter aircraft echoing through the Alborz Mountains several times—a surreal intrusion of industrial violence into one of the most beautiful landscapes on earth.

I had a train ticket to Tabriz, intending to cross into Armenia from there. But when key bridges along the highway and railway were struck, plans changed with the abruptness that war imposes on all itineraries. On the advice of a friend—Erfan Khosravi, whose companionship through those days I record here with gratitude—I left Tehran earlier than planned. We drove together to Astaneh-ye Ashrafiyeh, then onward to Bandar-e Anzali, Astara, and Ardabil. We spent one night on the banks of the Aras River, that ancient border between worlds. The next morning, Erfan accompanied me to the frontier, and I crossed—becoming, as I described it to myself at the time, the friend who leaves halfway.

It was approximately three in the afternoon. The passenger border was nearly empty. The only other travellers were a handful of Asian nationals—Indian, most likely—making their own quiet exit. The solitude of the crossing was its own commentary. A nation at war, and its borders almost deserted: not because people could not leave, but because the overwhelming majority had chosen, or been compelled by circumstance, to stay.

What the War Revealed

Several observations crystallised during those weeks, and I set them down here not as conclusions but as provisional readings of a situation that remains, in every sense, unfinished.

First: the solidarity against the war was broader and deeper than I had expected. I did not encounter a single person—not one—who defended the war or wished it to continue. This is remarkable in a society as factionalised as Iran’s. But a crucial caveat attends this observation: in the hyper-securitised atmosphere of wartime Iran, where the smallest note of dissent is met with immediate and disproportionate force, silence must not be read as consent. The quiet half of society—the millions who neither rally nor shout—are not necessarily aligned with the state’s narrative. They are simply surviving within the narrow corridor that power has left them.

Second: the Hezbollahi base was in a state of intense emotional and eschatological agitation. Some among them viewed the war through an explicitly apocalyptic lens—not as a geopolitical event but as a prelude to a cosmic reckoning. The nightly rituals of flag-waving and hymn-singing must be understood within this emotional register: not merely as political mobilisation but as collective catharsis, a liturgical performance enacted under the open sky of a besieged city.

Third: confidence in eventual victory was surprisingly high, even among those critical of the government. But this confidence was shadowed by a more sober and material fear: the economic aftermath. The bombing of steel plants and petrochemical facilities—the vertebrae of Iran’s industrial economy—portended inflation, unemployment, and a contraction of living standards that would outlast any ceasefire by years, perhaps decades. People knew they would survive the war. They were far less certain they would survive the peace.

Fourth: the notion of regime change through external pressure or popular uprising—still circulated with embarrassing confidence in certain diaspora salons—is, inside Iran, understood as a fantasy. Anyone who has spent even a week in wartime Tehran grasps that the overthrow of this government without civil war, massive bloodshed, and infrastructural devastation is not a serious proposition. It is a bedtime story told by exiles to exiles, and it deserves the analytical weight of one.

Fifth: outside the Hezbollahi core, the new Supreme Leader commands virtually no recognition, no trust, and no respect. Even among regime loyalists, the precise architecture of leadership remains opaque. People have adapted to this ambiguity—accommodated it, as Iranians accommodate so much—but accommodation is not legitimacy. The centre of power is felt everywhere and understood nowhere. For now, society has made its peace with a leadership that is, in the deepest sense, absent.

After the Crossing

I left Iran carrying two things that do not pass through customs: a revised understanding of my country and an anger that has not yet found its proper form. The revised understanding is this: Iran is neither the triumphant fortress of regime propaganda nor the broken victim of diaspora lamentation. It is something far more complex and far more alive—a society fractured along every conceivable axis and yet held together by forces that resist easy naming. Call it habit. Call it stubbornness. Call it love, if the word does not embarrass you. Eighty million people do not endure sustained aerial bombardment because they approve of their government. They endure it because the country is theirs—theirs in a sense that no regime, however authoritarian, can fully expropriate.

The anger is directed at those who made this war possible and at those who cheered it on from the safety of distance. At the architects of maximum pressure who imagined that bombs could produce democracy. At the exile politicians who traded their compatriots’ bodies for the fantasy of a restoration that history has already refused. At an international community whose conscience stirred not when Iranian children were pulled from rubble but when the price of oil twitched upward at European pumps. These failures of strategy, of empathy, and of elementary political imagination are the war’s true casualties—not the Iranian people, who have been wounded but not defeated, not silenced but not yet heard.

Distinguishing between suffering and defeat is not an academic exercise. It is, for Iranians, a matter of existential clarity. A people may be bombed, impoverished, censored, surveilled, and lied to—and still retain the capacity for future reconstitution. Nations are not reducible to the damage done to them in a single cycle of violence. They carry memory. They carry contradiction. They carry, beneath the rubble and the propaganda and the exhaustion, the unarticulated premise of a tomorrow that does not yet have a name.

I think of the clean Tehran air—a gift of reduced industry, of silenced factories, of a wartime economy running at a fraction of its capacity—and I think of it as an inadvertent metaphor. When the noise stops, when the traffic disappears, when the ordinary machinery of a dysfunctional normality is suspended, something else becomes visible: the city itself, the mountains behind it, the sky above it. Perhaps that is what war discloses, beneath all its horror. Not the fragility of a nation, but its obstinate, irreducible presence.

The road from Tehran to the Aras is long, and I drove most of it in silence. At the river’s edge, the night before the crossing, the water moved with the indifference of something that has seen every empire come and go—Achaemenid, Parthian, Safavid, Qajar, Pahlavi, Islamic Republic—and expects to see the next. The Aras does not take sides. It merely continues. Perhaps that is the most Iranian thing of all: to continue, not because the future is assured, but because stopping was never really an option.

April 2026

This essay is based on a first-hand account originally published as a Twitter/X thread by Kazeroun (@mkazeroun) on April 13, 2026. The observations, experiences, and reflections are his; the interpretation and prose are the author’s.

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